Abstract. For more than 30 years, scholars and practitioners have debated how to distinguish emotional disturbance (ED) from social maladjustment (SM) when determining special education eligibility and need. Scholarship on the nature of ED and SM has paid little attention to the legal parameters of practice despite the fundamentally legalistic nature of special education and resultant special education eligibility determinations. Accordingly, this study systematically reviewed and interpreted the published federal case law distinguishing SM from ED. This analysis of the idiosyncratic constellation of student characteristics and behaviors that courts held were relevant for proving SM or ED sheds light on the types of data school psychologists and multidisciplinary evaluation teams should consider during ED evaluations. The implications for practice and policy are discussed.
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Schools are the primary providers of mental health services for children and youth (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2004) , with many students with severe mental health needs receiving services and specialized instruction through special education. Emotional disturbance (ED; Office of Special Education Child With Disability Rule, 2012) is a federally recognized category of disability under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act of 2004 (2013) (IDEA), but it is defined vaguely and excludes social maladjustment (SM) as a basis for qualifying for services. For more than 30 years, scholars and practitioners have debated how to distinguish ED from SM when determining special education eligibility and needs (e.g., Bower, 1982; Forness, 1992b; Maag & Howell, 1992; Olympia et al., 2004; Slenkovich, 1992) . A critNothing in this article should be construed as legal advice. Practitioners should consult with their school attorney or seek other legal counsel for legal advice when responding to matters that may give rise to litigation. ical perspective missing from this discourse is the rule of law emerging from judicial decisions. Weinberg (1992) asserted that "there are no court cases to date which dictate or provide clarity on how to construe the meaning of [the] term social maladjustment" (p. 99). However, 22 years later, that is no longer true. It is necessary to acknowledge the implications of law in educational decisions because special education identification occurs at the nexus of science, professional ethos, and law. Accordingly, this study systematically reviewed and interpreted the published federal case law distinguishing SM from ED.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, now called IDEA, in 1975 to ensure schools provided students with disabilities the specialized instruction, services, and ancillary supports they needed to receive a free and appropriate public education. Under IDEA, ED is defined as follows:
A condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects a child's educational performance: (A) an inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors; (B) an inability to maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers; (C) inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances; (D) a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; and (E) a tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems (Office of Special Education Child With Disability Rule, 2012) These five criteria for ED were taken from Bower's 1957 study of students identified by their teachers as emotionally disturbed and whom Bower described as socially maladjusted (as cited by Bower, 1982) . Federal regulations diverged from Bower's conceptualization of ED by declaring that ED "does not apply to children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they have an emotional disturbance" (34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(9)). Thus, students qualify as having ED if a multidisciplinary evaluation team (MET) determines that (a) they have ED and (b) ED, rather than SM or something else, adversely affects their educational performance. Failure to satisfy both prongs of this test precludes special education eligibility for ED. The Department of Education (DOE) did not define SM, leaving it up to states and local educational authorities to decide which behaviors, emotions, or mental states constitute SM, and even whether to include the SM exclusion. Prior researchers have attempted to describe and quantify the variability among state definitions of ED (Becker et al., 2011; Olympia et al., 2004; Skiba, Grizzle, & Minke, 1994) , but none of them identified by citation the laws or regulations supporting their conclusions.
In Table 1 we provide the state regulations that govern eligibility for ED, denoting whether states precluded special education based on SM, which in some cases requires subjective interpretation. For instance, Utah and Connecticut presumably excluded SM as a basis for special education eligibility because their laws incorporated IDEA's definition of ED, which in turn incorporated the regulations that contain the SM exclusion. Idaho and North Dakota adopted IDEA's definition of ED while explicitly excluding SM in their published implementation guides (Idaho State Department of Education, 2009) or recommendations (North Dakota Department of Public Instruction, 2007) for local education agencies. Kentucky's ED definition excludes "children who display isolated . . . inappropriate behaviors that are the result of willful, intentional, or wanton actions" (707 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:002, 2011), which was arguably equivalent to an SM exclusion. Operating under these presumptions, we found that 46 states, plus the District of Columbia, excluded SM as a basis for special education. Only Wisconsin explicitly prohibited excluding students from special education because of SM. Minnesota, Iowa, and Indiana omitted the SM clause in their special education statutes, thus negating any need to differentiate SM from ED. School Psychology Review, 2014, Volume 43, No. 4 In addition, several states identified specific behaviors as not constituting ED: South Dakota excluded "common disciplinary problem behaviors, such as truancy, smoking, or breaking school conduct rules" (SD. Admin. R. 24:05:24.01:16 -17, 2013) ; Tennessee excluded "substance abuse related behaviors, gang-related behaviors, oppositional defiant behaviors, and/or conduct behavior problems" (Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0520-01-09-.02, 2013) ; and Vermont omitted students engaging in "multiple acts of truancy, or substance or sex abuse . . . struggle with authority, low frustration threshold, impulsivity, or manipulative behaviors" (Vt. Code R. 22-000-006, 2013) . Notably, Alaska and Vermont required that a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist diagnose a student as having ED, thus presumably adding a diagnosed mental disorder as a criterion for ED.
The variations in state regulations raise questions about how the legal definition of ED may influence ED prevalence rates among states. Table 1 shows that ED prevalence in 2011 was low among all states, ranging from 0.11% in Arkansas to 1.44% in Vermont, with a national mean of 0.57% (SD ϭ 0.30). States that excluded SM as a basis for special education eligibility had a mean prevalence (0.54%) that was nearly half that of the four states that did not (1.03%).
For many years, advocates have lamented that the lack of a definition of SM leads to inconsistent, and perhaps even unfair, implementation of IDEA for students with emotional and behavioral difficulties (e.g., Kauffman, 1980; Olympia et al., 2004) . In the 2006 rules for the implementation of IDEA, the DOE summarized commentators' concerns about the SM exclusion, which ranged from the lack of valid or reliable instruments to measure the construct to the social stigma associated with the term (71 Fed. Reg. 46, 549 -550, 2006) . In its discussion of these comments, the DOE noted that "historically, it has been very difficult for the field to come to consensus on the definition of emotional disturbance, which has remained unchanged Reg. 46, 549 -550, 2006) . This response suggests that differentiation of ED and SM will continue to occur not in federal policy but in scholarship and local practice.
POLICY DEBATE
The federal definition of ED is vague and provides little guidance to states or METs (Skiba et al., 1994) . Each of the five characteristics of ED are open for interpretation (e.g., what constitutes a "long period of time," "marked degree," "satisfactory" relationship, or "inappropriate" feelings or behaviors?), but the SM exclusion has garnered the most marked criticism (e.g., Forness & Kavale, 2000; Skiba & Grizzle, 1992) . Even Bower (1982) argued against the term, stating that the use within the law was meaningless because his original definition, on which the federal legal criteria were based, defined ED as SM. Unlike the five basic features of ED taken from Bower's research, SM did not emerge from the empirical literature . The silence in federal policy on the meaning of SM has resulted in a variety of divergent perspectives among scholars and practitioners about how to define and assess SM in children and youth. In particular, scholars have grappled with two related questions: (a) What is SM? (b) Does it preclude special education?
The differentiation of SM and ED embroils controversial policy debates about whether the public school system or juvenile justice system should be responsible for treating and ultimately rehabilitating students with conduct problems and antisocial behaviors. Advocating for a restrictive interpretation of ED eligibility, some scholars have suggested that SM reflects social problems such as drug or alcohol use and other risky behaviors or that SM indicates socialized delinquency as in gang involvement or other associations with antisocial peer groups (Center, 1990; Clarizio, 1987; Quay, 1987; Weinberg & Weinberg, 1990) . Scholars from this perspective suggest that juvenile delinquency negates schools' responsibility to students' special education needs. Other scholars have equated ED with internalizing disorders (e.g., depression, anxiety) and SM with externalizing disorders (e.g., attention deficit hyperactivity disorder [ADHD] , conduct disorder, oppositional defiant disorder), suggesting that only children with internalizing emotional problems are entitled to special education (Kelly, 1988; Slenkovich, 1992) . Conduct disorder in particular has been used to define SM (Cheney & Sampson, 1990 ). Still others have likened SM to antisocial behavior or psychopathy, highlighting predatory behavior and its imperviousness to treatment, thus excluding it from special education to conserve resources and limit exposing antisocial students to vulnerable students with internalizing disorders (Gacono & Hughes, 2004) . In this vein, some theorists have attempted to distinguish ED and SM in terms of voluntary and involuntary behavior, suggesting that ED reflects emotional dysregulation, or uncontrollable emotional reactions, whereas the inappropriate behaviors of students with SM are perceived as volitional and purposeful, thus precluding special education. For instance, Clarizio (1987) stated that students with ED "were more likely to be seen as doing poorly in school because psychological problems interfered with their school behavior, whereas [students with] SM were seen as doing poorly in school because of an unwillingness to comply" (p. 242).
Scholars arguing for more inclusive conceptualizations of ED cite persistent underidentification of ED in schools relative to estimates of mental disorders in children and youth, professional responsibility to all students with mental health needs, frequent comorbidity of internalizing and externalizing disorders, and the imprecision of assessment procedures and instruments (Olympia et al., 2004) as reasons to eliminate the SM exclusion. Some scholars argue that the SM exclusion creates a loophole (Raiser & Van Nagel, 1980 ) that allows schools to avoid the expense and trouble of educating many children with School Psychology Review, 2014, Volume 43, No. 4 mental illness who engage in disruptive or destructive behaviors (e.g., Bower, 1982; Forness, 1992a; Maag & Howell, 1992; Skiba et al., 1994) . Moreover, the increasing evidence of genetic bases of emotional and behavioral disorders raises doubts about whether SM should be attributed solely to social problems (Kehle, Bray, Theodore, Zhou, & McCoach, 2004) . Indeed, some advocates have argued that schools have the responsibility to intervene regardless of the label applied (Kehle et al., 2004) . Still others point out the importance of early intervention and the potential for schools to prevent chronic, severe behavior disorders in children with early delinquency (Bower, 1982) .
As we attempt to distinguish SM and ED, it is important to remember that special education categories represent administrative labels, not diagnoses, determined by education policy (Becker et al., 2011) . A student with ED does not necessarily have a mental disorder as defined in the psychiatric nosology. Indeed, the concept of ED is wholly specific to schools (Becker et al., 2011) and exists only in special education policy. Even when the term emotional disturbance is used by other federal agencies, it has a different meaning than it does under special education law (e.g., under the Public Health and Welfare section of 42 U.S.C. § 290bb-35, for services and grants pertaining to juvenile justice, ED is defined as a "diagnosable mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder that functionally impairs . . . family, school, or community activities, and . . . ability to achieve or maintain one or more developmentally-appropriate social, behavior, cognitive, communicative, or adaptive skills" [Public Health and Welfare Code, 2006, p. 694] ). Like ED, SM is a policy term with no clear links to empirically defined groups or broadly accepted mental health disorders (e.g., those articulated in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM-V]; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Furthermore, whereas psychiatric diagnoses, such as those proffered under the DSM-V, serve a variety of functions (e.g., signaling specific symptomatology, possible etiology, and treatment options), special education eligibility categories are essentially broad administrative labels indicating only students' entitlement to services. The distinctions between students with and without a disability are arbitrary and do not inform intervention planning or allow for inference regarding etiology or prognosis, both of which are assumed in several of the proffered perspectives on the ED-SM distinction. These issues, combined with the disagreements in the profession about how to define the terms, contribute to ongoing discontent in this area of practice.
JUDICIAL CASE LAW
Given the aforementioned dissention in the scholarly community, it is not surprising that MET members and families may also disagree about students' ED eligibility and that these disagreements lead to legal proceedings after unsatisfactory resolutions in mediations, due process hearings, and appeals to the state agency or civil court. Although the process varies according to state law, typically the first forum for these disputes is a trial before an administrative law judge. Either party may file an appeal in a federal district court and then in a federal appellate court. As the lawsuit proceeds from one forum to the next, the "law of the case" develops such that judges affirm or reverse decisions made by the lower courts. The judicial reasoning and holding of the highest court constitute case law.
In the context of special education litigation, lower courts must comply with the case law made by appellate courts within their jurisdiction unless new laws or regulations override the case law. Jurisdictions of the court of appeals for the federal circuit are presented in Figure 1 . The legal principle that case law binds future cases within the same jurisdiction is known as precedent or stare decisis. One important purpose of the stare decisis doctrine is to make predictable the outcomes of future lawsuits so that courts resolve disputes with similar facts in the same way. This predictability promotes settlement in future cases and enables people to avoid lawsuits by following the established prece-
Figure 1. Map of U.S. Courts of Appeals by Circuit
School Psychology Review, 2014, Volume 43, No. 4 dent. Because judges' decisions have bearing on future cases, educational leaders and practitioners may seek to develop policies and procedures in line with the prevailing case law. Thus, understanding the case law and the process through which it develops, including judges' reasoning on educational issues, is also relevant to practitioners.
THEORIES OF JUDICIAL LEGAL REASONING
The public has a strong interest in understanding how judges decide cases because the legitimacy of the U.S. judicial system rests on the fairness and soundness of the cognitive processes involved in such decision making. For much of the 20th century, the debate around judicial decision making focused on freedom and constraint in adjudication (i.e., making the final judgment in a legal proceeding). Taking the constraint perspective, rationalists argued that judicial reasoning consists of deductions, inductions, and analogies and that outcomes flow naturally from these logical forms of inference (Simon, 2004) . In other words, the law and facts, not the judge, determine the outcomes of cases. Conversely, legal realists argued that judges are influenced by "ulterior motives, or driven by hidden biases or other fundamentally flawed forms of inference" (Simon, 2004, p. 514) . These critics contended that judges (consciously or unconsciously) first decide which party will prevail and then accept as true or binding only the portions of the law and facts that support their determination (e.g., Simon, 2004) . Simon (1998 Simon ( , 2002 Simon ( , 2004 attempted to reconcile these polemic positions by explaining judicial decision making in terms of coherence-based reasoning. Drawing on theories and research in cognitive psychology, Simon argued that judges, like all humans, tend to organize complex cognitive tasks into coherent cognitive structures. "Based on a connectionist cognitive architecture, coherence-based reasoning shows that the decision making process progresses bidirectionally: premises and facts both determine conclusions and are affected by them in return" (Simon, 2004, p. 511) . Through this bidirectional framework, Simon united the legal realist and traditionalist perspectives, asserting that a "natural result of this cognitive process is the skewing of the premises and facts" (p. 511), which legal realists misinterpret as evidence that the judge's reasoning was biased or otherwise not guided by the facts and law. Simon (2002 Simon ( , 2004 argued that his experimental empirical studies involving participants who were not judges showed support for this theory (e.g., Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001) . In these studies, participants were asked to render verdicts in complex cases under various constraints (e.g., isolated arguments, order of presentation); findings indicated that initial judgments influenced perceptions of new information, final rulings, and decisions in later cases, thus showing coherence shifts in case comprehension and decision making. Although research supporting this theory is limited, it helps explain the process of judicial decision making and why decisions vary over time and across jurisdictions in cases involving similar fact patterns (i.e., factual circumstances and events that gave rise to the lawsuit).
PURPOSE
Early scholars grappling with the ED-SM controversy lamented the lack of case law in this area (Weinberg, 1992) . Twentytwo years later, there have been numerous legal challenges to MET decisions regarding the ineligibility for special education services of students determined to have SM. Such case law is relevant to the practice of school psychology and special education decision making because these decisions may apply to specific school settings. Educators and school psychologists need to ask two questions to use case law to guide their practice: (a) What rule did the case establish? (b) Does it apply to my school district? The purpose of this analysis was to help practitioners answer those questions for case law that differentiates SM from ED. To answer the first question, we examined the fact patterns and legal reasoning in cases in which federal courts differentiated SM from ED. This analysis of the idiosyncratic constellation of student characteristics and behaviors that courts held were relevant for proving SM or ED may shed light on what data school psychologists should collect and consider during ED evaluations. To answer the second question, we explained for whom each rule of law applies, for whom the law may be persuasive, and for whom the impact of the law is unknown.
METHOD
We included in this study published federal case law designated for publication (i.e., designated as constituting precedent) that explained the difference between SM and ED in the context of IDEA. On July 9, 2013, we searched the LexisNexis Academic Federal Court Cases Combined database using the following Boolean logic: ("Individuals with Disabilities") AND ("socially maladjusted" OR "social maladjustment") AND NOT POS-TURE (inmate OR prison OR habeas) AND NOT NOTICE (publi! OR unpubli!). We selected these search terms because courts interpreting or applying the SM exclusion would likely include SM in their decisions and cite the law (i.e., IDEA) that authorized the regulation in which the term appears. These procedures were intended to capture all relevant cases but may have inadvertently excluded cases in which unusual terminology was used. We excluded lawsuits commenced by prisoners, which typically involved challenges to the death penalty, because such case law was unlikely to be relevant for special education litigation. We also attempted to exclude unpublished case law, which has no precedential value (i.e., no control over future cases).
Our search yielded 38 cases, of which only 25 were marked for publication. We also searched case law citations and law reviews for potentially relevant decisions. Cases were included in this study if they met the following criteria: (a) they pertained to disputes about students' eligibility for special education services under IDEA, and (b) judges distinguished between ED and SM. Both authors independently evaluated whether the judge distinguished SM from ED as part of resolving legal disputes wherein parents requested special education services for their child based on ED and schools denied services because the MET decided the student's difficulties were due to SM. Interrater agreement was calculated by having a second observer rate the cases as meeting or not meeting the inclusion criteria. Each case that was rated as consistent with or not consistent with the inclusion criteria was counted as an agreement. We then divided the number of agreements by the total number of agreements and disagreements and multiplied by 100. The interrater agreement was 100%.
We relied on the second author's expertise as an experienced litigation attorney to analyze the case law in this study. Although we present below what we believe to be an impartial, low-inference summary of relevant case law, it is possible that others may disagree with our interpretation. For each case, we identified the judge's final decision and the evidence identified by the judge as persuasive in determining the student's eligibility for special education services. Per the inclusion criteria, each judge distinguished SM from ED as part of resolving legal disputes wherein parents requested special education services for their child based on ED and schools denied services because the MET decided the student's difficulties were due to SM.
ANALYSIS
We found 15 cases that met the inclusion criteria. For each case, we summarized below the judge's final written decision, which provides some insight into the cognitive decision-making process giving rise to the final outcome. Our analysis begins with cases in which the school district prevailed when asserting SM as a defense, followed by cases in which parents prevailed when asserting their child had ED. We summarized federal appellate court decisions in greater detail because they may have some precedential value for practitioners (see Table 2 ). By contrast, the district court cases have much narrower jurisdiction and no precedential value (see Table Table 2 
Differentiating Social Maladjustment
3). We included them to illustrate how lower courts apply precedent.
Court Denies Special Education Because of SM
Cases in which courts denied special education because of SM are presented below. These cases are also detailed in Tables 2  and 3 A.E. was a teenager diagnosed with learning disability (LD), as well as "conduct disorder related to emotional problems and a borderline personality disorder" (A.E. v. Independent School District No. 25, 1991, p. 473) . After she spent 3 months in a psychiatric hospital for a suicide attempt, her parents requested that the school reclassify her as having ED for special education. The MET refused to change A.E.'s classification to include ED as well as LD on the basis that her behavioral problems were indicative of SM not ED. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the MET, cursorily reasoning that SM "is not by itself conclusive evidence" of ED, that there was no evidence that the school acted in "bad faith," and that the evidence "clearly supports" denial of the ED classification (A.E., 1991, p. 476) . The judge did not provide the rationale for this ruling.
Fourth Circuit: Springer v. Fairfax County School Board (1998)
Edward Springer had a typical educational history until tenth grade, when he "developed significant behavioral problems," which included criminal arrest related to car theft, stealing from family, drug and alcohol abuse, truancy, reckless driving, and fighting (Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 1998, p. 661) . His parents placed him in a private boarding school and then asked the public school to qualify him as having ED, which would render the district liable for his tuition. The MET concluded Edward's "behavior indicated a conduct disorder that did not qualify as" ED (Springer, 1998, pp. 661-662) .
At the due process hearing, each party presented expert testimony. The parents relied on a letter from Edward's psychologist addressed to the juvenile court (rather than the court hearing the special education dispute), wherein he diagnosed Edward with conduct disorder and dysthymic disorder and attempted to persuade the judge to sentence Edward to a rehabilitation camp instead of incarceration. The school district's expert witnesses testified in person at trial and emphasized Edward "was in complete control of his actions" unlike students with ED, who "may be in such pain and in such difficulty that they cannot get to their goals" (Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 1998, p. 665) ; they described Edward as socially poised, skilled at manipulating others to get his way, and having fewer depressive symptoms than was typical for his age. In weighing the conflicting expert opinion testimony, the Fourth Circuit found the parents' expert testimony "insufficient in detail and dignity" and "sketchy" (Springer, 1998, p. 663) and found the school district's expert credulous and persuasive. Accordingly, it held that Edward did not qualify as having ED. It also opined on the sensibility of the SM exclusion:
Teenagers . . . can be a wild and unruly bunch. Adolescence is, almost by definition, a time of SM for many people. Thus a "bad conduct" definition of serious emotional disturbance might include almost as many people in special education as it excluded. Any definition that equated simple bad behavior with serious emotional disturbance would exponentially enlarge the burden IDEA places on state and local education authorities. Among other things, such a definition would require the schools to dispense criminal justice rather than special education. (Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 1998, p. 664) The ruling cited for support a California district court's definition of SM: "a persistent pattern of violating societal norms with lots of truancy, substance . . . abuse, i.e., a perpetual struggle with authority, easily frustrated, impulsive, and manipulative" (Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 1998, citing v. Bedford Central School District, 2007, p. 535) . During tenth grade and after his cousin was incarcerated for the abuse, M.C. began to exhibit behavior and learning problems. After M.C. was suspended from school for fighting and possession of drugs and at the parents' request, the MET evaluated M.C. for ED. The assessment yielded conflicting professional opinions about M.C.'s eligibility for special education. On the one hand, M.C.'s private psychologist and psychiatrist diagnosed him with major depression and posttraumatic stress disorder and indicated that his drug use was a secondary problem developed "in an attempt to numb or mask painful feelings" (N.C. v. Bedford, 2007, p. 538) . On the other hand, the school social worker asserted that "in ninth grade, M.C. maintained high academic and behavioral standards despite his sexual abuse and family conflict," but that "after his substance abuse escalated in his tenth grade year . . . his behavior both in and out of school deteriorated" and "without his drug use, M.C. would have been able to work through any post-traumatic stress through therapy" (N.C. v. Bedford, 2007, p. 538) . Siding with the school social worker, the MET determined that M.C. did not qualify as having ED because his drug abuse was the primary cause of his misconduct and academic decline. The Second Circuit agreed with the MET because the judge held that (a) the social worker was a more credible witness than M.C.'s private psychologist because the social worker had more contact with M.C. and (b) M.C.'s parents failed to prove that ED rather than drug use caused his poor performance.
District Court Case Law
Five published federal district court decisions have held that the student was ineligible for ED because of SM. In two of the cases, the parents were unable to prove that their teenagers' poor academic performance was caused by emotional problems rather than concurrent drug abuse (Nguyen v. District of Columbia, 2010; P.C. & M.C. v. Oceanside Union Free School District, 2011) . Although these courts ruled against the parents, they recognized that drug abuse and ED frequently "coexist (and exacerbate or beget one another)" (P.C. & M. C. v. Oceanside, 2011, p. 530) and that "untangling cause and effect in the context of drug use, misbehavior, and depression can be difficult" (Nguyen, 2010, p. 51) . In a third case with similar facts, the court reasoned that IDEA did not "require local educational authorities to accommodate all behavioral problems that may impede learning" (W.G. v. New York City Department of Education, 2011) .
In two other cases, the parents were unable to prove that their teenagers' medical impairments and other behavioral difficulties should have been classified as ED (Loch v. Education, 2004) . In Tracy, the student received accommodations for severe allergies and respiratory problems. The court concluded that he "engaged in unruly conduct, such as alcohol and drug abuse, but there was no indication that this conduct was the result of anything other than" SM (Tracy, 2004, p. 688) . Similarly, in Loch, the parents attempted to have their daughter's accommodations for diabetes expanded to include ED when she "just quit going to" school (Loch, 2008 (Loch, , p. 1085 . The court concluded that the student was "being treated for diabetes and has been treated at times for emotional problems. However, there is no proof that these conditions affected her educational performance to the extent that she required special services and programs" (Loch, 2008 (Loch, , p. 1084 .
Board of Education of Edwardsville, 2008; Tracy v. Beaufort County Board of

Court Grants Special Education for ED
Cases in which courts granted special education for ED are presented below. These cases are also detailed in Tables 2 and 3 .
Sixth Circuit: Babb v. Knox County School System (1992)
Jason Babb had a history of psychopathology that began in preschool with torturing animals, violence toward his sibling and classSchool Psychology Review, 2014, Volume 43, No. 4 mates, and setting fires. During middle school, his mother could no longer control him and sent him to live with his father, who promptly requested the school evaluate Jason for ED. When the school psychologist assessed Jason, she conducted limited academic and psychological tests and "concentrated exclusively on Jason's three months at South Middle School" (Babb v. Knox County School System, 1992, p. 105) . The MET found Jason was not eligible for special education, which Mr. Babb did not challenge until he learned 3 weeks later that the school intended to expel Jason. Mr. Babb then unilaterally placed Jason in a private psychiatric hospital, where Jason received diagnoses of "conduct disorder, severe solitary aggressive type, and paranoid and schizoid traits" (Babb, 1992, p. 106 ). His doctors described him as having "a highly ideational/ schizoid personality style that is marked by underlying rage, paranoid misinterpretation of interpersonal situations, hyper vigilance, affective reactivity, impulsive acting out of unconscious issues, intense splitting, suspiciousness, and withdrawal into fantasy" (Babb, 1992, p. 107) . On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that Jason qualified as having ED and criticized the school psychologist for failing to "examine Jason's complete academic, psychological and behavioral history," which should have included consultation with Jason's psychologist, Mr. Babb, and Jason's mother and stepfather, as well as a review of Jason's previous academic records (Babb, 1992, p. 108) .
Ninth Circuit: Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg (1995)
Jeremy Wartenberg's parents sought reimbursement from a California school district for the cost of private residential treatment for their adolescent son who exhibited severe conduct disorder and ADHD (Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 1995) . The district's potential liability hinged on whether SM or LD caused Jeremy's behavior problems, which in turn prevented him from learning. The dissenting justice framed the issue as follows: Did Jeremy choose to break rules or did his disability cause him to do so? Although this case did not involve eligibility for ED, the court's reasoning provides some useful insight about the SM exclusion.
At trial, the court weighed the credibility of conflicting expert testimony. Several of Jeremy's private mental health providers testified that his misconduct had an organic basis, possibly resulting from a high fever and convulsion when Jeremy was an infant. Conversely, the school psychologist testified that "ascribing Jeremy's poor performance to some neurochemical deficiency was overly speculative, because Ritalin therapy did not provide relief from symptoms he would have expected if Jeremy had a neurochemical imbalance" (Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 1995, p. 888) . Instead, the school psychologist believed that the primary cause of Jeremy's problems was conduct disorder, which he defined as conduct that Jeremy knows is wrong and could control if he wanted to do so. The Ninth Circuit held that LD, not SM, was the primary cause of Jeremy's misconduct. It reasoned that when a covered condition (like ED) and a noncovered condition (like SM) both cause the student's learning problems, then the student qualifies for special education if the primary cause of the learning problem was a covered condition.
Second Circuit: Muller v. Committee on Special Education (1998)
Treena Muller's school difficulties began early in life; she was classified as speech impaired in kindergarten and retained in first grade. She received special education services until fourth grade and remedial reading services until seventh grade. In ninth grade, she began having "behavior problems, such as poor attendance in school, cutting classes, failing to complete assignments, staying out late at night, and generally disobeying her parents" (Muller v. Committee on Special Education, 1998, p. 97) . After she attempted suicide, she began extensive treatment at residential facilities where she was diagnosed with conduct disorder, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder related to her early childhood, when she resided in an orphanage. Treena's service providers testified that she "responded well, both emotionally and academically, to the small, highly structured environment" at the residential facility (Muller, 1998, p. 99) . Treena's parents requested the school district evaluate Treena for ED when their insurance coverage for her care was depleted. The MET concluded Treena was not eligible for special education. At trial, the school district argued that "Treena suffered from a mere 'conduct disorder'" and "that students with conduct disorders are not entitled to special education" (Muller, 1998, p. 103) .
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that Treena met the criteria for ED given that she had a "generally pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression" (Muller v. Committee on Special Education, 1998, p. 104) . The court clarified that Treena did not need to be diagnosed formally with clinical depression to meet this criterion. She also demonstrated "inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances," such as "suicide attempts, . . . arson attempts, . . . lies, cutting classes, failure to complete homework, stealing things, quitting the basketball team, . . . defiance, poor grades and academic performance" (Muller, 1998, p. 104) . The court reasoned that although "many of these behaviors are, of course, not unusual or 'inappropriate' by themselves," the overall pattern of conduct was sufficient to demonstrate ED. The fact that many of Treena's "emotional problems were unrelated to school is of little if any relevance, so long as those problems had a significant effect on her ability to learn" (Muller, 1998, p. 104) . Furthermore, the court concluded that testimony from Treena's psychologists that her emotional problems adversely affected her educational performance, along with evidence that her academic performance improved when she received therapeutic treatment, was sufficient to satisfy IDEA's causation requirement. In other words, treatment responsiveness was an indirect means to proving ED adversely affected her school performance.
Eighth Circuit: Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C. (2001)
A.C. was identified as having ED and diagnosed with conduct disorder after a lengthy history of school refusal, classroom disruption, profanity, insubordination, alcohol and drug abuse, running away from home, criminal conduct, suicide attempts, and sexual promiscuity (Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., 2001) . Her mother asked the district to pay the $55,000 tuition for an out-ofstate treatment program; the district offered to pay one third. At trial, the parties disputed whether A.C.'s individualized education plan, which did not place her in a residential treatment facility, was reasonably calculated to provide her free and appropriate public education. The district court found that there was no evidence that A.C. was unable to attend the day treatment program offered in her individualized education plan; thus, residential treatment was not necessary to meet her educational needs.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit declined to construe A.C.'s misconduct as "purely a moral failing" or to draw a "stark distinction between unwillingness and inability to behave appropriately" (Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., 2001, pp. 776 -777) . Instead, it reasoned that "there is a gray area between normal, voluntary conduct and involuntary physiological response, and that area is where Congress has chosen to locate behavioral problems such as A.C.'s" (Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., 2001, p. 775) . It further reasoned the following:
The mere fact that Congress regards emotional disturbances as disabilities entitling a child to special education shows that, at least in Congress's judgment, social and emotional problems are not ipso facto separable from the learning process. . . . If the problem prevents a disabled child from receiving educational benefit, then it should not matter that the problem is not cognitive in nature or that it causes the child even more trouble outside the classroom than within it. What should control our decision is not whether the problem itself is "educational" or "noneducational," but whether it needs to be addressed in order for the child to learn. (Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., 2001, pp. 776 -777) Ultimately, the ruling held that A.C.'s "truancy and defiance of authority result from a genuine emotional disturbance" (Independent School District No. 284 v. A.C., 2001, p. 776 ).
Eighth Circuit: Hansen v. Republic R-III School District (2010/2011)
When J.H. was in fifth grade, he was diagnosed with conduct disorder, bipolar disorder, and ADHD. Trial testimony established that he had "erratic behavior," had "expressed his desire to die and made other suicidal comments," and "would change from being happygo-lucky to being very angry" (Hansen v. Republic R-III School District, 2010, pp. 1-2). J.H. was suspended repeatedly for threatening classmates and teachers; the school mental health clinician terminated her work with him because he threatened her. Furthermore, he "consistently performed poorly in his classes and on standardized tests" (Hansen, 2011 (Hansen, , p. 1025 . At trial, his parents argued that he qualified as having ED because he had bipolar disorder and "an inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers" (Hansen, 2011 (Hansen, , p. 1026 . The school argued that J.H. was capable of maintaining relationships with teachers because the director of special education testified that J.H. "did well with some teachers but not well with others" (Hansen, 2011, p. 1027) and that J.H. primarily had SM rather than ED. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that the director of special education's testimony was based on written behavior reports instead of personal interactions with J.H. and held that J.H. qualified as having ED.
District Case Law
In Johnson v. Metro Davidson County School System (2000) , the parents requested that their adolescent daughter Tiffany be classified as having ED. Four experts in psychology and psychiatry disagreed about Tiffany's diagnoses, which included reactive attachment disorder, ADHD, conduct disorder, bipolar disorder, and psychopathy. Two of the experts argued that Tiffany should not qualify as having ED because the root of her problems were behavioral instead of a "psychotic process" (Johnson, 2000, p. 917) or "misperception of the environment" (Johnson, 2000, p. 911) . The court disagreed and held that altogether, the "murky and conflicting" evidence was sufficient to prove ED (Johnson, 2000, p. 917) . Because Tiffany's grades mostly had been satisfactory, the school argued that the alleged ED did not adversely affect Tiffany's educational performance; thus, she did not qualify for special services. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the "problem, therefore, is not so much Tiffany's lack of performance but that she has been unable to remain in school" because she was repeatedly expelled for misconduct (Johnson, 2000, p. 918) .
In Eschenasy v. New York City Department of Education (2009), Ann had a long history of self-harm, behavioral problems (e.g., stealing, sexual misconduct, drug abuse, running away from home), and academic problems (e.g., reading difficulties, failing classes). When Ann was an adolescent, the MET evaluated her for ED but determined she did not qualify. On appeal, the court held that Ann's trichotillomania, self-cutting, and suicide attempt demonstrated inappropriate behavior under otherwise normal circumstances and a generally pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression (Eschenasy, 2009, pp. 647-648) . The school district argued that even if Ann had ED, she failed to prove that her trichotillomania, self-cutting, and suicide attempt caused her academic problems rather than her simultaneous truancy, drug abuse, and other bad behaviors. Following Muller v. Committee on Special Education (1998, pp. 103-104) , the court held that testimony from a psychologist "that a student's emotional difficulties adversely affected her education, together with evidence that her educational performance improved in settings where her emotional problems were being addressed clinically, adequately supported the conclusion that" ED caused her academic problems (Eschenasy, 2009, p. 650) .
In New Paltz Central School District v. St. Pierre (2007) , M.S. was a model student behaviorally and academically until ninth grade, when his parents began divorce proceedings. He was then "uncontrollable at home" (New Paltz Central School District, 2007, p. 395 ) and unhappy and angry at school, and he was abusing drugs, skipping classes, and declining academically. When his parents placed him in a residential treatment facility, the school district refused to pay his educational costs. At trial, the school argued that M.S. had SM because "he did not manifest any of the characteristics of an emotional disturbance when not using drugs" (New Paltz Central School District, 2007, p. 398) . Without addressing the school district's causation argument, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that M.S. exhibited several of the characteristics of ED.
DISCUSSION
We have interpreted and summarized case law to show how courts analyze and apply the ED-SM distinction in special education eligibility disputes and to provide practitioners guidance on this contentious issue. Scholars have offered numerous interpretations of SM, and the judicial reasoning on this matter is similarly diverse. In making the distinction between ED and SM where IDEA provides no guidance on the meaning of SM, judges applied a variety of perspectives on development, behavior, and mental health when interpreting the facts of cases, resulting in decisions varying across time and jurisdictions, just as Simon's (2004) theory posits.
Judicial Reasoning About Causation
In Schaeffer v. Weast (2005) , the Supreme Court established that the party filing a lawsuit (the plaintiff) bears the burden of proving his or her case. Most ED-SM cases originate with parents contesting an MET's decision about their child's ineligibility for ED, which means that parents frequently bear the burden of proving that ED, rather than SM, caused a student's educational difficulties. Although IDEA requires evidence that ED is the cause of the student's school problems, it does not identify how plaintiffs can prove causation. The Muller v. Committee on Special Education (1998) court filled this gap for litigants in the Second Circuit by holding that the parents satisfied their burden of proof for causation by (a) showing that their daughter's educational performance improved when she was in a clinical setting and (b) proffering testimony from a qualified expert that the ED adversely affected her educational performance. Until this case is overturned by case law or abrogated by the executive branch, future litigants can use treatment responsiveness to evaluate a causal link between ED and educational performance.
The novel rule of law generated by the Muller decision may be evaluated from different theories of legal reasoning. Legal realists would argue that the Muller court sympathized with the family and wanted to grant them relief, so it engaged in judicial activism and undermined the SM exclusion. Conversely, proponents of the constraint perspective would argue that the unique facts of Muller and an impartial interpretation of the ambiguous statute compelled the court to delineate this particular method for distinguishing SM versus ED as the cause of academic problems. Balancing both perspectives, proponents of the coherence-based reasoning model (Simon, 2004) might argue that the holding of Muller reflects a complex, bidirectional decisionmaking process whereby judges attempt to apply ambiguous law to facts as equitably as possible. The precise mechanisms of judicial reasoning in Muller and all other cases will never be known; the public is privy only to the carefully crafted written document that constitutes the court's official decision.
Although the actual model of judicial reasoning in Muller remains a mystery, the implication of this decision for school districts and families within the Second Circuit is clear: causation may be proven indirectly, in part, by treatment responsiveness. Accordingly, school psychologists should assess and document students' treatment responsiveness. METs could use a problem-solving approach or behavioral response to intervention (RTI) framework within the context of prereferral intervention or a special education evaluation to gather data on students' responsiveness to behavioral or social-emotional interventions. Although the targeted domain may be social, emotional, or behavioral, practitioners should also collect data on academic performance to show how the behaviors suggesting ED affect educational performance (if at all). That is, school psychologists should collect concurrently behavioral and academic data when ED is suspected or to be ruled out.
The issue of causation may present ethical dilemmas for practitioners, especially if they testify at trial. On the one hand, some federal circuit courts and IDEA presume that it is possible to prove a causal relationship between behavioral or emotional problems and academic problems. Our summaries show that such inferences were common within legal proceedings. On the other hand, causal inferences are often beyond the scope of valid professional judgment and empirically validated approaches to assessment of emotional or behavioral functioning (Katsiyannis & Maag, 2001; Nelson, 1992; Olympia et al., 2004) . This dilemma may be particularly challenging for school psychologists when substance abuse is one of the many plausible causes of the student 's problems (N.C. v. Bedford Central School District, 2007; Nguyen v. District of Columbia, 2010; P.C. & M.C. v. Oceanside Union Free School District, 2011) . Arguably, such a restrictive interpretation of the causation requirement may contravene Congress's intent to protect the rights of students with SM who also have ED because it appears to be nearly impossible to prove that ED caused the student's academic problems rather than concurrent behaviors indicative of SM. School psychologists, however, should expect courts in the Fourth Circuit (and perhaps other circuits) to deny special education when the facts support an inference of mixed causation.
Judicial Reasoning About Professional Judgment
In each case, expert witnesses offered their professional judgments about whether the student met the legal criteria for ED. School psychologists testifying at trial are typically considered expert witnesses who may offer an opinion as to whether the student qualifies as having ED. If a private evaluator refutes this opinion, then the court has to choose which expert opinion has more credibility and weight. In doing so, the court may consider how well the expert substantiated his or her opinion. For instance, in Babb v. Knox County School System (1992) , the court reprimanded the school psychologist for not interviewing the student's noncustodial parent or reviewing records from the student's prior school. In Hansen v. Republic R-III School District (2011) , the court discounted the director of special education's testimony because it was based only on written reports, not personal interactions. In N. C. v. Bedford Central School District (2008) , the court found the school social worker more credible than the private psychologist because the social worker spent more time with the student.
These cases exemplify how closely courts will likely scrutinize the adequacy of school psychologists' evaluations. Although credibility determinations tend to be very fact intensive, courts seem to value testimony based on personal knowledge about students gained through a comprehensive assessment process. A recent study of school psychologists' assessment practices in ED cases, however, showed that practitioners frequently were not engaging in multimethod, multisource evaluations . Instead, school psychologists report relying heavily on behavior rating scales and omitting other important data sources, particularly parent and child interviews and observations. Such habits are not legally defensible under federal statutes, regulations, or the case law of any jurisdiction. Furthermore, although test developers have tried to create instruments specifically intended to identify ED and distinguish ED from SM, the reliability and validity of these instruments are generally poor (Becker et al., 2011; Costenbader & Buntaine, 1999; Olympia et al., 2004; Reid, Epstein, Pastor, & Ryser, 2000; Skiba & Grizzle, 1992) . In sum, school psychologists would be well-served and serve students well by engaging in multisource, multimethod evaluations using empirically validated procedures to gather data directly from students, family members, and other individuals familiar with the students (e.g., service providers) to determine special education eligibility.
Similarly, the case law underscores the importance of METs looking beyond mere mental disorder diagnoses to the particular behaviors, as well as their sequence and relations to academic difficulties and responsiveness to intervention, when determining special education eligibility. The students in these cases were diagnosed with a variety of mental disorders, but none of the judges found that the mere presence (or absence) of such diagnoses was the sole determinant of eligibility, which contrasts sharply with scholarly emphases on such diagnoses for ED identification .
METs may benefit from reflecting on how well their decision-making processes fit within a coherence-based reasoning framework (Simon, 2004) . Do team members have confirmation bias in favor of their first impressions of the student or the referral concern, or are evaluations a dynamic process whereby team members critically evaluate data and debate with open minds the totality of the evidence? In this vein, are parents and students genuine and valued collaborators in the decision-making process, or are MET meetings merely forums for school staff to persuade families to accept predetermined conclusions? The coherence-based reasoning model raises interesting questions about the decision-making processes of METs.
The Importance of Jurisdiction
Where students live in the United States appears to affect greatly their likelihood of qualifying for special education on the basis of ED if a case goes to due process. Consequently, school psychologists need to know which federal circuit has jurisdiction over their school district (see Figure 1 ) to understand the case law governing their practice. Practitioners in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, or Eleventh Circuits have little or no guidance on how their federal circuit would define SM. These circuits may follow the lead of the Fourth Circuit and narrowly define ED, they may follow the Eighth Circuit's liberal construction of ED, or they may formulate an entirely new methodology for distinguishing ED from SM.
Implications for Policy and Research
Taken together, case law indicates that when students display behavioral or socialemotional difficulties that may warrant consideration of special education eligibility for ED, METs should first apply multidomain progress monitoring of social-behavioral interventions, followed by comprehensive (i.e., multisource, multimethod) evaluations using empirically validated procedures to identify students' learning and behavioral needs. These two elements (intervention with progress monitoring and comprehensive assessment practices) appear to constitute the necessary elements of a legally sound eligibility determination process when practitioners attempt to determine that students have social-emotional difficulties eligible for special education services.
School psychologists should advocate for the substantive involvement of families throughout the evaluation process, which is consistent with IDEA's language regarding the composition and function of METs. Although parent input is specified in federal regulations, it may be helpful to develop more descriptive policies and procedures to ensure that family involvement is sought from the outset and used in a collaborative problemsolving framework to ensure that family members' knowledge of the student and perspectives on educational decisions are elicited, respected, and integrated in professionals' practices. For students engaged with mental health providers outside of school, policies and procedures may also specify expectations for the involvement of these professionals and the use of the data they can provide in the eligibility determination process. Without such efforts, eligibility determination may not be considered appropriate or legally defensible when challenged through due process.
School psychologists can also promote policies at the building, district, and state levels to ensure all students who display severe behavioral or social-emotional difficulties are provided research-based prereferral interven-tions with frequent progress monitoring and high quality evaluations consistent with the requirements of IDEA and case law. This could be achieved, for instance, through the integration of behavioral screening and assessment processes, supports, and interventions in an RTI framework (e.g., Hawken, Vincent, & Schumann, 2008; Stewart, Benner, Martella, & Marchand-Martella, 2007 ). An integrated RTI model is an effective, efficient means of supporting students' academic and behavioral needs through a multitier support system (Bohanon, Goodman, & McIntosh, 2009 ) while also providing thorough documentation of students' progress and, for students with severe chronic difficulties, function-based interventions valuable to ED determinations.
Given the value of response to treatment in understanding students' educational needs, even where RTI frameworks are not used, school psychologists can advocate for policies and procedures specifying the use of researchbased prereferral interventions and stringent monitoring and documentation of students' behavioral and academic outcomes when students demonstrate social-emotional or behavioral difficulties. In light of the strong empirical support for positive behavior supports (e.g., Goh & Bambara, 2012) , psychologists may encourage their use not only for students already identified for special education but also for students at risk of having ED.
In the future, researchers may examine the extent to which educational decisions about students' ED eligibility are consistent with law and research-based practice. Researchers may also study how the specific criteria adopted in district policies or state law affect eligibility determinations or how differences in the specific criteria for ED (e.g., excluding cases of conduct disorder, requiring diagnosed mental disorders) would affect eligibility and prevalence, much like recent studies of the potential impact of changes in the criteria for a clinical diagnosis of autism (e.g., McPartland, Reichow, & Volkmar, 2012) . Such research would allow for empirically based inferences about the systemic impact of specific case law or policy changes on ED identification. Scholars may also study how considerations and conceptualizations of mental health symptoms and needs influence special education determinations and treatment planning for ED well as other disabilities, such as other health impairments, autism, and LD, in light of frequent comorbidity.
CONCLUSION
Although the ED-SM distinction has been debated in scholarship for more than 30 years, we identified only 15 published federal cases from 6 of the 11 federal circuits that addressed the distinction. Practitioners should not disregard this body of case law simply because it is relatively small. Unlike empirical research, the precedential value of case law does not hinge on the number of cases that rule a certain way but rather hinges on the status of the court making the ruling. For example, a single court of appeals case can shape practice, litigation, and national policy for decades (e.g., Brown v. Board of Education). Furthermore, by analyzing the fact patterns of these 15 cases, we can discern the rule of law and gain insight about which factors influenced the court's assessment of witness credibility and the comprehensiveness of evaluations.
The distinction between ED and SM is a difficult one to make. Scholars, practitioners, and judges are divided over the meaning of these concepts and the implications for students' special education needs. By declining to define SM, Congress and the DOE have essentially left it to the judiciary to do so. Students with disabilities and society are illserved by such tactics because the judiciary cannot be proactive. It only has the authority to decide issues that parties bring before it. Thus, the judiciary can take (and has taken) many years to publish case law about how to distinguish ED from SM. In the meantime, school districts attempt to fulfill their legal obligations without clear guidance on the parameters of those obligations, creating inconsistent outcomes over time and across districts.
For school psychologists, valid identification of ED has been characterized as one of the more difficult areas of practice because of lack of guidance from both research and policy . We systematically reviewed case law to shed light on the legal distinction between SM and ED. Although our analysis does not settle this debate, it does offer some guidance to schools and practitioners on how to structure ED evaluations and decisions to engage in legally defensible actions. Practitioners should be knowledgeable of the case law applicable in their settings so that they can craft policies and procedures consistent with IDEA and the local rule of law.
